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JOINT VENTURES AND THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS
Richard B. Lillich*
Joint ventures are one of the most remarkable post-World War II
international business developments. Although the late Professor
Friedmann noted in 1971 that they were becoming "the most important form of foreign investment in the developing countries of Africa,
Asia and Latin America," ' "only within the last two decades has the
joint capital venture received more than scant attention."' 2 Now,
whether one is interested in establishing a "minority joint venture," in
which the foreign investor holds less than fifty percent of the equity in
the joint enterprise and the host country the majority interest, or a
"multipartite joint venture," in which a group of international firms
establishes a joint enterprise in the host country, often with the participation of private local interests or the government of that country, the
3
available literature to which one may turn for guidance is immense.
Yet, understandably in view of the rapid growth in the number and
complexity of international joint ventures, many problems relevant to
their use remain unaddressed. One of them - the question of when a
joint venture or a participant therein, injured by the wrongful act of a
foreign state, satisfies the nationality requirement for purposes of
bringing an international claim - is the subject of this article. 4
* Howard W. Smith Professor of Law, University of Virginia, and President, Procedural
Aspects of International Law Institute. The views expressed in this article reflect the personal
opinions of the writer which are not necessarily held by the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S.
Department of State, for which he has served since 1981 as a legal consultant in connection with
U.S. claims before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
1. W. FRIEDMANN & J. BtGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (1971).
2. Buffenstein, Foreign Investment Arbitration and Joint Ventures, 5 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 191, 194 (1980).
3. See, e.g., JOINT VENTURING ABROAD (D. Goldsweig ed. 1985); THE MULTINATIONAL

JOINT VENTURE (H. Ravine & S. Nelson eds. 1981); Birrell, InternationalJoint Ventures, 1975
PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 241 (1976).

4. Like other commentators, the present writer and Professor Christenson did not mention
joint venture claims in their treatment of eligible claimants. See R. LILLICH & G. CHRISTENSON,
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION chs. I & 11 (1962). Such
claims are mentioned but not discussed by the author of the most recent treatment of eligible
claimants, who apparently considered them controlled by the customary international law precedents governing partnership claims. See Ohly, A FunctionalAnalysis of Claimant Eligibility, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 281, 290-91 (R.

Lillich ed. 1983). No other references to joint venture claims, at least in the English language
literature, have been found. Cf Buffenstein, supra note 2.
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INTRODUCTION

Since, as the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in the
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case, "it is the bond of nationality between the State and the individual which alone confers upon the State
the right of diplomatic protection," 5 it was only a matter of time
-before questions about the nationality requirement's impact upon joint
venture claims arose. While some unreported state practice doubtless
exists, the first public airing of the questions raised by the claims of
joint ventures or participants therein occurred before the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, established pursuant to the 1981 Algiers
Accords.
Article VII(l) of the Claims Settlement Agreement 6 makes the
claims of "legal entities" (including partnerships and joint ventures)
organized under claimant state law eligible only if natural persons who
are claimant state citizens hold a 50 percent interest in such entities.
Applying this provision, the Tribunal held early on that a U.S. partnership had standing to claim when 50 percent or more of the ownership interests therein were held by U.S. citizens. 7 Although it has not
had to address the question, presumably the Tribunal would reach the
same result by analogy were the claim of a U.S. joint venture involved.
If a claimant state partnership or joint venture cannot satisfy the
50 percent test, however, or if the entity is one formed under the law
of the respondent or a third state, no explicit guidance can be obtained
from the language of Article VII(l) as to whether a claimant state
partner/participant in the ineligible partnership/joint venture can
bring a claim based upon his ownership interest therein. Whether he
has such standing depends upon the Tribunal's interpretation of the
general language found in the Claims Settlement Agreement.
The primary guide to interpreting the Claims Settlement Agreement, including questions of the Tribunal's jurisdiction and the standing of claimants, is "the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." 8
The Claims Settlement Agreement being a treaty, its interpretation
5. Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Estonia v. Lithuania), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 76, at
16 (Feb. 28).
6. See Agreement on the Release of the American Hostages, 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. (Feb.
1981), at 1, 4, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 223, 232 (1981). On the background, organization and
jurisprudence of the Tribunal from its inception through late 1983, see THE IRAN-UNITED
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-1983 (R. Lillich ed. 1984).
7. See Queens Office Tower Assocs. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 247,
248 (1983-I) (100 percent U.S.-owned); Dames & Moore v. Iran, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 212, 216-17
(1983-Il) (90 percent U.S.-owned).
8. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92 (1969) (entered intoforce Jan. 27, 1980). For Tribunal applica-

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 10:430

also is governed by customary international law. Indeed, Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifically
provides that "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties" should be applied in interpreting treaties. 9 Hence, in determining whether a claimant has standing to bring
a claim based upon his interest in a claimant state partnership or joint
venture, the Tribunal must look to the customary international law
that has governed the claims of partnerships and partners thereof in
the past. '0
The United States relied upon this body of law in its Memorial in
what effectively became the test case for joint venture claims before the
Tribunal, Housing & Urban Services Int'l, Inc. v. TRC (HA US)," arguing that a U.S. partner/participant in an eligible partnership/joint
venture had standing to bring a claim under Article VII(l) of the
Claims Settlement Agreement to the extent of his pro rata interest in
the partnership/joint venture.1 2 Attached to its Memorial as Appendix A was a legal opinion by the present writer entitled "Partnerships
and Members Thereof as Eligible Claimants Under Customary International Law." 13 This opinion, after examining the opinions of publicists, evidence of state practice and the relevant decisions of
international tribunals governing such claims, concluded, inter alia,
that "[c]ustomary international law permits partners in an ineligible
claimant state, as well as respondent or third state, partnerships to
14
bring claims based upon theirpro rata interest in the partnership."
The next three sections of this article are an updated and slightly revised version of this opinion, followed by a final section summarizing
the Tribunal's jurisprudence after HA US and offering some tentative
conclusions about the current status of partnership and joint venture
claims.
II.

OPINIONS OF PUBLICISTS

The leading authority on the Law of International Claims, the late
tions of this test, see Case No. A-I, 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 189, 190 (1981-82); Case No. A-18, 5
IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 251, 259 (1984-1).
9. 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M. at 692. See Case No. A-18, 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 260.
10. See also Article V of the Claims Settlement Agreement, which enjoins the Tribunal to
decide all cases on the basis of, inter alia, international law.
11. 9 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 313 (1985-11).

12. Memorial of the United States on the Issue of Jurisdiction Over Claims of U.S. Nationals
Participating with Non-Nationals in Partnerships or Associations at 17-23, reprinted in Iranian
Assets Litigation Rep. at 8,440-41 (May 11, 1984).
13. Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. at 8,442 (May 11, 1984).
14. Id. at 8,447.
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Professor Borchard, does not specifically address the question of the
claims of partnerships qua partnerships. Rather, noting that under
municipal law partnerships rarely are regarded as legal entities possessing juridical status, he assumes sub silentio that a partnership
claim can be brought under international law when all the partners in
the firm possess claimant state nationality. Taking a similar functional
approach where a claimant state firm has one or more non-national
partners, he points out that
[i]nternational tribunals have on many occasions permitted one of several partners to recover for his individual interest in partnership property, where it clearly appeared that the other partner or partners labored
under a disability depriving him or them of standing before the commission, and this, notwithstanding the general [municipal law] rule that
claims in favor of a partnership must be prosecuted by all the partners.
Thus, the citizen partners in a firm consisting partly of nationals and
partly of aliens have been allowed1 5by arbitral courts to recover their pro
rata share of partnership claims.
This approach to partnership claims, while superficially similar to
that of "piercing the corporate veil" to permit stockholder claims, is
analytically distinct "[o]wing to the conception of the severability of
-16 Moreover,
the interests of partners in partnership property ....
even when the partnership is based in the respondent state or a third
state giving it some sort of juridical status not known at common law,
Borchard reports that international tribunals have not considered
themselves bound by such municipal law concepts, but have applied a
functional approach and rendered awards to claimant state partners
based upon their proportionate interests in the firm. "Civil law countries in which such firms have established themselves," he writes,
"have usually denied the severability of the interests of the partners
composing the firm, yet international commissions have in most cases
admitted the separate claims of the individual partners for their undi17
vided pro rata shares of the partnership property."
Other publicists, assessing the jurisprudence of international tribunals, have reached conclusions identical to Borchard's. Thus, Ralston
states that
[q]uestions of partnership have repeatedly arisen, and often claims have
been allowed to be presented by a partner for his undivided interest in
the subject-matter of his claim when his associates in the partnership
were so situated, because of citizenship or otherwise, as not to have a
standing before the commission.18
15. E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 614 (1915).

16. Id. at 613.
17. Id. at 615-16.
18. J. RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 139 (1926).
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Feller, focusing exclusively upon the decisions of the various Mexican
Claims Commissions, points out that, while the claimant state nationality of all the partners was sufficient to make a partnership an eligible
claimant when it apparently had been formed and was located in the
claimant state, similar claimant state nationality of all the partners
was not enough to support a partnership claim when the situs of the
partnership was in Mexico.1 9 In the latter situation, however, he notes
that the commissions allowed claims filed in the name of the individual partners. 20 Nielsen, the commissioner under a 1934 lump sum
agreement between the United States and Turkey, 2 1 endorsed this approach by remarking that a "claim might have been presented in the
name of a partnership of American members organized in the United
States and doing business in Turkey. '' 22 "Had a valid claim been
presented in behalf of an American partnership having an alien member," he added, "compensation might have been made to the Ameri23
can members to the extent of their interests."
Over a decade ago, after reviewing post-World War II lump sum
settlement practice, the present writer and Professor Weston reached
the same conclusion as the above publicists, namely, that
[t]raditionally, international law has permitted [partnership] claims
when all the members of a partnershipin a claimantstate were nationals
of that state. If one of the partners was the national of another state,
however, then the partnership itself was not an eligible claimant,
although the remaining partners 24
were protected individually to the extent of their interests in the firm.
To this conclusion should be added the clarifying observation, so obvious that it frequently goes unstated by the publicists, that claimant
state partners in a respondent or third state partnership also routinely
have had claims allowed to the extent of theirprorata interests in such
25
a partnership.
It is readily apparent from even a cursory survey of contemporary
international claims practice that, as has been stated elsewhere,
19.
20.
21.
22.

A. FELLER, THE MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSIONS 1923-1934, at 16 (1935).
Id.
United States-Turkey Agreement, Oct. 25, 1934, 49 Stat. 3670, E.A.S. No. 73.
F. NIELSEN, AMERICAN-TURKISH CLAIMS SETTLEMENT: OPINIONS AND REPORT 396

(1937) (citing the Davies case, OPINIONS OF COMMISSIONERS

[UNITED STATES-MEXICAN

CLAIMS COMMISSION], Sept. 26, 1928, to May 17, 1929, at 282 (1929)) (Nota Bene: citation
should be to the Deutz case, infra note 23).
23. Id. at 397 (citing the Deutz case, OPINIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS, supra note 22, at
213) (Nota Bene: citation should be to the Davies case, supra note 22).
24. 1 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP
SUM AGREEMENTS 61-62 (1975) (emphasis added).
25. Cf. R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL COMMISSIONS 85-86 (1962).
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"[p]artnership claims occur less frequently today than they did in
years past, due in large part to the decline of this method of doing
business abroad."' 26 Yet, to the extent that they have arisen since
World War II, as the evidence of state practice contained in the next
section will reveal, they have been treated in the manner described by
the above publicists. 27 The most recent writer on the subject of partnership claims amply confirms the continued vitality of the traditional
international law rules governing such claims.
Under customary international law .... "both partners and partnerships
are eligible claimants if they meet the nationality requirements," but
partnerships are entitled to protection as entities only when all of their
members are nationals of the claimant State. Hence, under the customary rule, if a single partner is a nonnational of the claimant State, the
claim of the partnership will not be entertained. Owing, however, to
"the conception of the severability of the interests of partners in partnership property," international tribunals have had little difficulty in disaggregating the interests of partners and in permitting "citizen partners in
of aliens ... to recover
a firm consisting partly of nationals and partly
28
their pro rata share of partnership claims.

III.

EVIDENCE OF STATE PRACTICE

State practice concerning the claims of partnerships and members
thereof dates back to the early days of the nineteenth century. 29 The
traditional approach, described by the publicists in the previous section, was uniformly supported by those states submitting their views
on partnership claims to the League of Nations. Thus the United
States, responding to the questionnaire of the Preparatory Committee
of the Conference for the Codification of International Law, stated in
1929 that the "preferment of partnership claims has been solely on
account of those members thereof who are nationals of the claimant
State."'30 Other replies applicable to partnership claims are as follows:
Egypt: "If there are several persons interested of different nationalities,
claimant State can only act on behalf
the claim should be divided. The
31
of those who are its nationals."
26.
27.
28.
29.

R. LILLICH & G. CHRISTENSON, supra note 4, at 14.
See generally 1 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note 24, at 61-63.
Ohly, supra note 4, at 291.
See 6 J.B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 640-41 (1906). See also 3 J.B.

MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE
UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 2325-31 (1898) [hereinafter J.B. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS].

30. III Bases of Discussion for the Conference for the Codification of InternationalLaw, Supp.
at 24, League of Nations Doc. C.75(a) M.69(a) 1929 V (1929), reprinted in 5 G. HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 827 (1943).
31. III Bases of Discussion, supra note 30, at 142, League of Nations Doc. C.75 M.69 1929 V
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Finland: "If some of the interested parties only are nationals of the State
concerned, the latter cannot defend the interests
of others, however awk32
ward the results of this situation may be."
Germany: "The fact that some only of the individuals concerned are
nationals of a given State does not prevent the latter from submitting a
claim. It is understood, however, that, as regards damage suffered by
private individuals reparation can only be33claimed in respect of persons
who are nationals of the claimant State."
Japan: "If some only of the individuals concerned belong to a particular
34
State, that State should support the claim of its own people only."
Netherlands: "[T]he individuals35concerned may claim their proportional
share in the damage suffered."
South Africa: "If some of the complainants only are nationals of the
claiming State, the latter
can only press that part of the claims which
'36
concerns its nationals."
The United States has consistently maintained the position taken
in its response to the League. Thus in 1937 the Department of State,
in an authoritative official publication, reiterated that "[iun determining whether a partnership is entitled to be regarded as a national and
hence entitled to diplomatic protection, it is necessary to look to the
nationality of the partners forming the partnership. ' 37 Again, in 1943,
it stated that "[u]nincorporated companies are entitled to diplomatic
protection to the extent of the ownership of their assets by bona fide
38
American interests."
Other states have maintained the same position. Thus Great Britain, with a unique post-World War II exception mentioned below,
subscribes to the view that "a firm is not an entity in English law, and
that intervention and protection can only extend to individual British
interests in a firm, not the firm itself."' 39 An examination of recent
French practice reveals no instance where the claim of a partnership
qua partnership has been espoused or settled. Apparently France, too,
eschews bringing such claims, at least when all the partners are not
(1929), reprinted in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [1930] 564 (S. Rosenne ed. 1975).
32. Id.
33. III Bases of Discussion, supra note 30, at 141, reprinted in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE, supra note 31, at 563.
34. I1 Bases of Discussion, supra note 30, at 143, reprinted in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE, supra note 31, at 565.
35. III Bases ofDiscussion, supra note 30, at 144, reprinted in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE, supra note 31, at 566.
36. III Bases of Discussion, supra, note 30, at 140, reprinted in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE, supra note 31, at 562.
37. 1 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (1937).
38. 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 30, at 827.
39. J. JONES, BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW AND PRACTICE 299 n.1 (1947). Cf 5 C. PARRY,
BRITISH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 502 (1965).
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French nationals, preferring to settle the several claims of the French

partners based upon their proportionate interests in the partnership
4
rather than a single claim brought in the partnership's name. 0
The sparseness of recent practice with respect to the claims of partnerships and members thereof may be attributed not only to the decline in this method of doing business, mentioned in the previous
section, but also to the fact that most international claims in the postWorld War II period have been settled by lump sum agreements, the
texts of which generally are silent on the question. Thus, of the numerous lump sum agreements concluded by the United States, only

five specifically authorize the claims of "legal entities" (including partnerships) organized in the United States and 50 percent U.S.-owned, a
variation on the traditional international and U.S. approach to partnership claims that finds reflection in Article VII(l) of the Claims Settlement
Agreement. 4 1
Recent
legislation
authorizing
the

"preadjudication" of claims against the German Democratic Republic
42
and Vietnam also takes this approach.

Among the other lump sum settlements, two agreements con-

cluded by Denmark expressly mention claims by "firms or associations" and "business undertakings," phrases embracing partnership

claims. 43 Switzerland's settlement agreements, all of which cover the
claims of "commercial companies,"" also have been authoritatively
construed to include commercial partnerships. 45 With the exception
of Great Britain's agreements, to be discussed immediately below, all
40. B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POSTWAR FRENCH PRACTICE 168 n.397, 169

(1971).
41. See Article 2(b) of the United States-Rumanian Agreement, Mar. 30, 1960, 11 U.S.T.
317, 318, T.I.A.S. No. 4451, 371 U.N.T.S. 163, 166, reprinted in 2 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON,
supra note 24, at 217, 218; Article 3(1)(b) of the United States-Hungarian Agreement of Mar. 6,
1973, 24 U.S.T. 522, 524, T.I.A.S. No. 7569, reprintedin 1 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note
24, at 324, 325; Article 3(b) of the United States-Egyptian Agreement, May 1, 1976, 27 U.S.T.
4214, 4218, T.I.A.S. No. 8446; Article 2 of the United States-Czech Agreement, Jan. 29, 1982,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 371, 372 (1982); and Article I(B) of the United States-Ethiopian Agreement, Dec. 19, 1985, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 56, 57 (1986).
42. See Titles VI & VII of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended, 22
U.S.C. §§ 1644a(1)(b) & 1645a(1)(B) (1982).
43. See Article 3 of the Danish-Czech Agreement, [1960] Lovtidende C 308, reprintedin 2 R.
LILLICH & B. WESTON,supra note 24, at 176, 177, and Article 5 of the Danish-Polish Agreements, Feb. 26, 1953, [1954] Lovtidende C 1, 186 U.N.T.S. 301, 305, reprinted in 2 R. LILLICH &
B. WESTON, supra note 24, at 85, 87.
44. See, e.g., Article 3 of the Swiss-Czech Agreement, Dec. 22, 1949, [1950] ROLF 21,
[1950] AS 21, reprinted in 2 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note 24, at 31, 32.
45. Bindschedler, Recent Decisions in Switzerland-II, 3 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 512, 517-18
(1954). Cf., e.g., Article 2 of the Swedish-Hungarian Agreement, Mar. 31, 1951, [1951] S.O. No.
16, reprinted in 2 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON,supra note 24, at 56, 57 an early Swedish lump sum
settlement providing for the claims of "commercial companies having their headquarters in Sweden or involving Swedish majority interests."
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the remaining lump sum settlements, now numbering nearly 200,46
give no explicit guidance on the question of claims by partnerships,
47
much less claims by members thereof.
Most of Great Britain's lump sum settlements, however, expressly
provide for the claims of "firms and associations .... ",48 Under British
lump sum (as opposed to its diplomatic) practice, "customary international law has been ignored and the claims of partnerships have been
permitted despite the presence of non-national partners. Indeed, in
one claim [before the Foreign Compensation Commission] both partners of a firm actually were non-British, yet the FCC rendered an
award in the partnership's name."'4 9 There is little if anything to commend this approach to partnership claims, which has been widely criticized.3 0 Certainly it is not functionally oriented, since it permits
Great Britain, the claimant state, to obtain compensation from a respondent state for injuries to non-British interests. No other state follows this approach, so it may be regarded as a sport. Indeed, in its
normal diplomatic (as opposed to lump sum) practice, Great Britain
apparently still adheres to the traditional approach.5"
Swiss lump sum practice also departs from the traditional approach, although far less so than its British counterpart, in that Switzerland regards partnerships as possessing at least some of the
attributes of legal personality and thus capable of having a nationality
distinct from that of their members. Thus, as in the case of corporations, "certain partnerships as such are eligible for protection if the
partners controlling them are Swiss."5' 2 Since a partnership would not
46. See generally Lillich & Weston, Lump Sum Agreements: Their Continuing Contribution
to the Law ofInternational Claims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1988).
47. But see Article 2 of the United States-Rumanian Agreement, supra note 41, which mentions claims through "a partnership or an unincorporated association .. "
48. See, e.g., Article 1(2)(b) of the British-U.A.R. Agreement, Sept. 13, 1971, [1971] Gr.
Brit. T.S. Egypt No. 1 (Cmnd. 4853), reprinted in I R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note 24, at
315.
49. 1 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note 24, at 63.
50. See, e.g., R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POSTWAR BRITISH PRACTICE 34-36
(1967).
51. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. The latest version of the Rules Applying to
International Claims published by the British Government in October 1985 provides that "HMG
may take up the claim of a corporation or otherjuridicalperson which is created and regulated by
the law of the United Kingdom .... Rule IV (emphasis added). The phrase "juridical person"
is defined in a comment to include "a company, corporation or other association having a legal
personality distinct from its members ..." No mention is made of partnerships. Moreover, in a
comment to Rule I defining the term "United Kingdom national," aside from "individuals" only
"companies incorporated under the law of the United Kingdom" are covered. The Rules are
reprinted in Warbrick, Protection of Nationals Abroad, 37 INrr'L & COMP. L.Q. 1002, 1006-08
(1988).
52. Caflisch, International Claims.- Contemporary Swiss Practice, in INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS: CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN PRACTICE 139, 149 (R. Lillich & B. Weston eds. 1982).
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be an eligible claimant under Swiss practice unless Swiss partners had
a predominant interest in it, the Swiss test obviously is much less extreme than the British and, in practice, closely approximates the modification of the traditional international law approach reflected in
recent United States lump sum practice and written into Article
VII(l) of the Claims Settlement Agreement.
The above practice aside, available data about how claimant states
adjudicate claims following lump sum settlements suggest that they
have followed the customary international law rule in their distribution process. Thus in Austria, whose lump sum agreements do not
specifically mention the claims of partnerships or partners thereof,
Professor Seidl-Hohenveldern has found that "[t]he Austrian Distribution Laws provide that, where a measure by the respondent State
affected a partnership, compensation is due to to the Austrian natural
or juridical persons in proportion to their part in the partnership as it
53
existed at the time the measure was taken."
In concluding this section on state practice, it should be recalled
that, even if a partnership claim qua partnership claim fails under
either the traditional approach (all partners not being claimant state
nationals), British lump sum practice (partnership not registered in the
U.K.), Swiss practice (Swiss partners lacking control or predominant
interest), or recent United States lump sum practice (50 percent U.S.
ownership interest lacking), the individual partners themselves still
have the option of bringing claims on their own behalf based upon
their proportionate interests in the firm. 54 Thus under any of these
tests - as well as under the test found in Article VII(l) of the Claims
Settlement Agreement - partners are not dependent upon the part55
nership establishing claimant state nationality to obtain redress.
Similarly, claimant state partners in respondent and third state partnerships always are able to bring claims for their pro rata interests in
such partnerships. 56 The decisions of international tribunals on this
latter point, from which the opinions of publicists and much of the
state practice mentioned in the above two sections derives, will be examined in the section that follows.
53. Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Claims: Contemporary Austrian Practice, in INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN PRACTICE, supra note 52, at 31.
54. See, e.g., R. LILLICH, supra note 50, at 36 n.54.
55. See Claim of Ralph E. Gassman et al., 1981 FCSC Ann. Rep. 89.
56. Interview with Hon. Desmond Kerr, Head, Claims Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in London (Mar. 2, 1984); Telephone interview with Prof. Lucius Caflisch, Graduate Institute of International Studies, in Geneva (Mar. 9, 1984).
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DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

Numerous decisions of international tribunals invoke the traditional rule that partnership claims qua partnership claims are compensable only if all the partners are claimant state nationals. Thus in the
Massardo, Carbone & Co. case, 57 decided by a commission established
under a 1903 protocol between Italy and Venezuela, where there was
some initial confusion about whether the claim was being brought by
the partnership itself or by the surviving partners and their heirs, Umpire Ralston ruled that "[i]f it is designed to claim for the entire partnership, the names of all should be given, together with the
appropriate proofs of citizenship, for only Italian subjects may have
any interest in any claim passed on by this Commission.''58 Although
examples will be given below, it is worth noting now that if such
proofs had not been forthcoming, the surviving Italian partners would
have received awards based upon their proportionate interests in the
partnership. As Umpire Ralston, writing in his private capacity some
years later, remarked: "Other claims in the condition of having diverse citizenship among the members of the partnership were
presented before the Italian-Venezuelan Commission, and awards
were given proportionate to the amount of the Italian interest, no suggestion having been made on the part of Venezuela that their domicile
in Venezuela had created Venezuelan citizenship in the
partnerships." 59
In the Deutz case, 60 the United States-Mexican Commission had
before it a claim by Adolph Deutz and Charles Deutz, a copartnership, doing business under the firm name of A. Deutz and Brother.
The Commission allowed the claim after the U.S. citizenship of both
partners was established. 6 1 Again, in the Wellington, Sears & Co. case,
where a claim was made by "a partnership composed of American
citizens" based upon the requisition by Turkish military authorities of
10 bales of cotton duck in 1914, Commissioner Nielsen, adjudicating
claims pursuant to a lump sum agreement between the United States
and Turkey, ruled that the partnership was an eligible claimant since
all the partners remained United States nationals. "The membership
of the firm has changed since that date, but, account being taken of
provisions of partnership agreements entered into from time to time, it
is believed that compensation may properly be paid to the partnership
57. J. RALSTON, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF 1903, at 706 (1904).

58. Id. at 709-10, reprinted in 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 30, at 828.
59. J. RALSTON, supra note 18, at 140.
60. See supra note 23.
61. Id.
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as now constituted. ' 62 Finally, for present purposes, the Arbuckel
Brothers case 63 illustrates the routine application of the traditional
rule: there a claim by a firm whose partners all were United States
nationals was allowed in the firm's name.
When all the partners are not claimant state nationals, precluding
the allowance of a claim in the partnership's name, international tribunals consistently have rendered awards to claimant state partners
based upon their pro rata interests in the firm, as the extract from
Ralston quoted above reveals. 64 One of the earliest such decisions was
handed down by the national commission established to adjudicate
United States claims against Mexico following the 1848 Treaty of
Peace with Mexico. 65 The question was whether to allow the claim of
a United States citizen who was a member of a Mexican partnership.
The commission held that, since the claimant himself was a United
States national, "his interest in the claim is therefore within the cognizance of the Board, and he is entitled to an award to the extent of his
interest in so much of the claim as the Board shall decide to be valid
66
under the treaty."
The above commission, in the Morrison case, 67 where it denied the
claim by the surviving British partner of a firm doing business in Mexico, the other partner of which was a United States citizen, gave the
following explanation of its rationale in such cases: "This principle of
the law of nations which confers upon the members of a firm different
rights according to their several national characters has been frequently recognized by judicial decisions in cases of prize."' 68 After
quoting a leading authority on prize law for this principle, the commission concluded that "[a]ccording to the principle laid down in this
authority it is proper to award to the American member of the firm an
indemnity equal to his share of the property destroyed, while the other
member, not being a citizen of the United States, can claim no portion
of the indemnity which the United States has procured for its own
69
citizens alone."
62. F. NIELSEN, supra note 22, at 459.

63.

AMERICAN-MEXICAN

CLAIMS COMMISSION,

REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

237 (1948).

64. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
65. United States-Mexico Treaty of Peace, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
66. 2 Opinions: Commissioners on Claims Against Mexico 960 (manuscript), quoted in R.
LILLICH, supra note 25, at 85.
67. 3 J.B. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 29, at 2325.

68. Id. at 2327.
69. Id. Accord Hargous case, id.; Homan case, 4 J.B. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 29, at 3409.
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Numerous decisions by other international arbitral tribunals have
applied this principle. A sampling follows:
Brach case: 70 Claim involved Mexico's seizure of "a debt due from one
Guadalupe Gonzales to a neutral house of which the claimant was a
partner owning a one-third interest." '7 1 The claimant, being a United
States citizen, was rendered an award based upon one-third of the debt.
Jennings, Laughland & Co. case: 72 Claim by a partnership with a
United States and a British partner. "They were in partnership, but
what share each had in the business there is no evidence to show; but if
the umpire had thought proper to award compensation on account of the
claim, it would only have been to Jennings, as a citizen of the United
States, the same proportion of'73the compensation as his share in the business bore to the whole of it."

Ruden case: 74 Claim by a United States citizen, who with a national of
New Grenada had an equal interest in a partnership owning property in
Peru, allowed "based on the losses sustained by the company of which
Ruden was a partner .... "75 The compensation awarded was calculated

upon the claimant's one-half interest in the firm.
Poggioli case: 76 Claim before the Italian-Venezuelan Commission by
two Italians doing business in Venezuela under the firm name of Poggioli
Hermanos. One had died leaving only Venezuelan heirs. "It appears...
that Silvio Poggioli's [the surviving Italian partner's] interest amounted
to 65.99 per cent of the whole, and all allowances made on account of
injuries to the partnership are to be represented by an award of this percentage in favor of Silvio Poggioli. .... -77
Davies case: 78 Claim originally filed before the United States-Mexican
Commission in the name of "Samuel Davies and John W. Vincent, a
partnership." When the United States nationality of Vincent could not
be established, claim was refiled in the name of Davies, who had an undivided one-half interest in the firm, with the amount of damages claimed
reduced by one-half. Claim allowed in this amount, representing the
proportionate interest of the partner whose United States nationality was
proved.
Spillane case: 79 Claim of partnership formed under Mexican law denied,
but British-Mexican Commission saw no objection to a claim filed in the
70. 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 37, at 2021 (1943).
71. Id.
72. 3 J.B. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 29, at 3135.

73. Id. at 3136.
74. 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 37, at 1426 n.220 (1937).
75. Id.
76. J. RALSTON, supra note 57, at 847.
77. Id. at 871. Accord Baasch & Romer case, id. at 906 (Netherlands-Venezuelan Commission rendered an award proportionate to the interests of Dutch members of a partnership in
liquidation).
78. OPINIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS [UNITED STATES-MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION],
supra note 22.

79.
(1933).

FURTHER DECISIONS AND OPINIONS OF THE [BRITISH-MEXICAN] COMMISSIONERS

72
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80

name of the parthers.
Poisson case:81 Claim by United States citizen for damages to and expropriation of property owned by a partnership in which claimant and a
British national had equal interests. Commission rendered award to
claimant based upon his "joint-ownership interest in the property ....-82
Finally, last but not least, mention should be made of three oftcited claims where United States partners in respondent state partnerships obtained awards based upon their proportionate interests in the
firms involved. In the first of these claims, the Alsop case, 83 the United
States espoused the claim of the surviving partners of Alsop & Co., a
partnership formed and registered in Chile, composed of ten members,
all U.S. citizens. Chile argued that, as the firm was registered in Chile
and hence, under the law of Chile, was a juridical person distinct from
its members considered individually, their grievances could not properly be the subject of a diplomatic claim. In reply, Secretary of State
Knox responded as follows:
It is indeed true that Alsop & Co., in order that it might do business
in Chile, registered under the Chilean law, and in this sense became a
Chilean partnership; but it should be remembered that the partners were
all American citizens, that they were investing in their enterprise American capital, that the losses suffered have fallen upon American citizens,
and that such losses have involved the destruction of American capital
and enterprise.... To contest the right of the Government of the United
States to intervene in behalf of the injured American partners in such a
partnership, under such conditions, for the loss of American capital,
would be to contest the fundamental right of the Government of the
United States to intervene in behalf of its citizens - a proposition for
which the Government of Chile would not,
the Government of the
84
United States feels, for a moment contend.
In the event, it was agreed to submit the dispute to the King of Great
Britain as an amiable compositeur. When Chile again renewed her argument, the King was advised to disregard it.85 He did and proceeded
to render a substantial award in favor of the United States partners in
the firm.
The second claim to receive widespread attention in legal circles
was the Ziat, Ben Kiran case, 86 where a British partner in a Spanish
80. Id. at 79, reprinted in 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 30, at 828. Accord Stevens & Gibb
case, id. at 191; Adams case, id. at 199.
81. AMERICAN-MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, supra note 63, at 288.
82. Id. at 290.
83. The Alsop Claim (U.S. v. Chile), 11 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 349 (1911).
84. 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 30, at 829.
85. 11 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, supra note 83, at 360, reprinted in 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra
note 30, at 830.
86. Ziat, Ben Kiran Case (Gr. Brit. v. Spain), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 729 (1924).

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

(Vol. 10:430

firm that had suffered losses during a government-inspired riot
brought a claim based upon his proportionate share in the partnership.
Spain, like Chile in the Alsop case, contended that the firm was a juridical person possessing Spanish nationality and hence claims brought
by partners thereof were not receivable. Judge Huber, the arbitrator,
rejecting the notion that Spanish municipal law concepts as to the status of partnerships operated on the international plane, upheld the
right of the British partner to claim for his proportionate share and
87
proceeded to consider the claim on its merits.
Finally, the Shufeldt case8" involved a concession contract between
Guatemala and private individuals that required the latter to form a
partnership under the laws of Guatemala to operate the concession.
When Guatemala nullified the concession contract, Shufeldt, a United
States citizen, who was a member of the partnership, prevailed upon
his government to espouse his claim. When it came to arbitration,
Guatemala argued that
notwithstanding that Shufeldt may have acquired rights under the contract in the first instance, yet by forming the company required to be
formed under the contract ..

.,

and assigning to such company all his

rights under the contract, he has divested himself of all his rights and
vested them in the company Shufeldt & Company, and that Shufeldt
"has no rights under the contract which he could either enforce by action in courts of law
or by invoking the aid of the United States as an
89
American citizen."
The arbitrator, Chief Justice Sir Herbert Sisnitt, rejected this argument, stating that
it is not the rights of the partnership that are in question but the personal
interest of Shufeldt in the partnership .... International law will not be

bound by municipal law or by anything but natural justice, and will look
behind the legal person to the real interests involved. 90
Accordingly, he found the claim to be espousable and rendered an
award to Shufeldt based upon his proportionate interest in the Guatemalan partnership.
In concluding this section on the decisions of international tribunals - almost all of which were rendered pursuant to compromis containing general standards and hence reflect customary international
law rather than lex specialis - it should be noted that, although the
International Court of Justice has not had occasion to pass upon the
questions addressed herein, the present writer is confident beyond a
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 729-30.
Shufeldt Claim (Guat. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1079 (1930).
Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1097-98.
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doubt that it would resolve them in similar fashion. Support for this
belief is found in the fact that in the Nottebohm case91 Guatemala apparently never even raised the question of whether Liechtenstein had
standing (substantive standing, that is, not the procedural standing issue on which the case was decided) to bring Nottebohm's claim,
grounded as it was principally upon his interest in a Guatemalan partnership, Nottebohm Hermanos. Guatemala obviously had learned the
teaching of Shufeldt and calculated that the Court had too. Certainly
today, were it faced with the claim of a partnership or a member
thereof, the Court would brush aside spurious appeals to municipal
law and harken to Chief Justice Sisnitt's injunction in his Shufeldt
Award: "International law will not be bound by municipal law or by
anything but natural justice, and will look behind the legal person to
'92
see the real interests involved."
Nor is there anything in the Court's Judgment in the Barcelona
Traction case 93 to suggest a contrary result. First, Barcelona Traction
involved corporation and stockholder questions, not questions of partnerships and partners. 94 Second, even if the claims of stockholders
and partners, arguendo, are analogous, the Court in Barcelona held
only that indirect stockholder claims were impermissible, its comments on direct stockholder claims being pure dictum. Since claimant
state partners predicate their claims upon their direct interests in the
partnership, the Court's holding has little or no relevance to the questions at hand. Third, both the holding and the dictum in Barcelona
were based upon the assumption (erroneous, in the present writer's
opinion) that there was no customary international law governing
stockholder claims and hence resort must be had to municipal law
norms.9 5 Here, as this article already has demonstrated, there are ample customary international law precedents indicating that partners
may bring claims based upon their pro rata interests in ineligible partnerships. Finally, as already made clear by the quotations from Professor Borchard at the beginning of Section 11,96 the underlying
rationale behind the diplomatic protection of corporations/stockholders and partnerships/partners is both different and non-transferrable.
As a former President of the International Court of Justice, Jimenez
91. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 6).
92. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
93. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (New Application: 1962) (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 1 (Second Phase, Judgment of Feb. 5).
94. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
95. See Lillich, The Rigidity of Barcelona, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 522 (1971).
96. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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de Ar6chaga, in discussing the diplomatic protection of stockholders
in corporations, states with reference to the cases set out above involving partnerships:
Other awards are invoked ... but these arbitral decisions are not
relevant to the question here examined, since they all refer, not to business corporations or companies by shares, but to partnerships and limited partnerships, that is to say, to various forms of sociitispersonnelles,
whose legal personality is not so distinct nor generally recognized by all
systems of law, particularly by the common law countries. International
precedents which may have been established with respect to partnerships, limited partnerships, and other forms of socitds personnelles cannot be simply extended to business corporations, companies by shares,
and other forms of socidtds de capital. Legal personality is much
stronger, more generally recognized, and better differentiated in the latter case. Even in these regimes where partnerships are considered as
legal subjects, the partner is not entirely detached from the Socidti in the
form in which a shareholder is detached from a corporation. This is a
consequence of the basic fact that a partner is always personally and
more deeply involved. .... 97
V.

CONCLUSION

In the HA US case, mentioned in the Introduction,9 8 the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal, having already held that U.S. partnerships had standing to claim when 50 percent or more owned by U.S.
citizens, 9 9 faced the key question of whether a U.S. partner/participant in an ineligible partnership/joint venture had standing to bring a
claim under Article VII(l) of the Claims Settlement Agreement to the
extent of his pro rata interest in the partnership/joint venture. To
have answered this question in the negative, of course, would have
"non-suited" a considerable number of U.S. claimants before the Tribunal, a fact well-known to Iran and its legal counsel. 100 Moreover, to
the extent that such a decision would have worked a change in the
customary international law approach discussed in Sections II-IV, it
conceivably could have left most participants in joint ventures without
97. De Arichaga, Diplomatic Protection of Shareholdersin InternationalLaw, 4 PHIL. INT'L
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1270

L.J. 71, 86-87 (1965), reprinted in 8 M.
(1967).

98. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 7.
100. See, e.g., Jones, The Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal Private Rights and State Responsibility, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-1983, supra note 6, at 51,
71-72, where as an "alternative approach" to the traditional one set out in Sections lI-IV the
author suggests British postwar lump sum practice, which in his view leaves open the question of
whether "a claim may be presented in respect of an injury to a partner as a result of the infringement of the rights of the partnership save where such a claim is expressly permitted by the
compromis," which of course is not the case under the Claims Settlement Agreement.
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any protection under the Law of International Claims in the future. 01
Fortunately, the Tribunal in HA US did not regard the joint venture agreement involved as barring the claim of the U.S. participant, a
New York corporation.
While international law seems to accept that as a rule a partner may
not sue in his own name alone on a cause of action accruing to the partnership, where special reasons or circumstances required it, "international tribunals have had little difficulty in disaggregating the interests of
partners and in permitting"
partners to recover their pro rata share of
02
partnership claims. 1

Citing the Ruden, Spillane and Ziat, Ben Kiran cases, all discussed in
the previous section, 0 3 the Tribunal observed that
[t]hese cases generally involved partnerships that had separate legal personality under the relevant municipal law. The rationale for allowing
such partners to bring individual claims is in part that unlike shareholders of corporations - who generally may not pursue the claims of the
corporation - a "partner is not entirely detached from the Socidtd in the
form in which a shareholder is detached from a corporation."[ t ° 4] Since
this is true for partnerships having separate legal personality, afortiori it
applies to partnerships such as the present one that are not juridical
entities.'

Additionally, the Tribunal noted
that the reason most often cited for the severability of a partner's personal claims - that he would otherwise be prevented from claiming
before an international forum because of a foreign partner's disability[ 10 6] - applies in the context of the nationality requirements of the
Claims Settlement Declaration. Thus, the Tribunal finds that international law, in the particular circumstances of this case, permits HAUS to
bring a claim for its [85 percent proportionate] interest .... 107.

The Tribunal's award in HA US is an important reaffirmation of
the customary international law approach to the claims of partners in
101. As the International Court of Justice intended stockholders to be left after Barcelona
Traction. Fortunately, most states appear to have ignored the Judgment and continue to espouse
and settle stockholder claims by lump sum agreement. See Lillich & Weston, supra note 46, at
78-80, for a list of recent agreements, most which permit such claims. Both direct and indirect
stockholder claims, moreover, are authorized by Articles VI(1) & (2) respectively of the Claims
Settlement Agreement.
102. Housing & Urban Services Int'l Inc. v. TRC, 9 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 313, 330 (1985-II)
(quoting Ohly, supra note 28 and accompanying text).
103. See supra notes 74, 79 & 86 and accompanying text.
104. 9 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 331 (quoting De Ar6chaga, supra note 97 and accompanying
text).
105. Id. at 331.
106. Id. at 332 (citing J. RALSTON, supra note 18 and accompanying text).
107. Id. "[T]he sources already cited - all of which permitted the claimant partner to claim
only his pro rata share - indicate that there is widespread agreement that, where claims of
individual partners for their personal interest are allowed, those claims are limited to the extent
of such interest." Id. at 333.
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ineligible partnerships and a path-breaking application of this approach to the claims of participants in similarly ineligible joint ventures. While no subsequent award of the Tribunal applying or
developing the rationale behind HA US has yet appeared, 0 8 its significance on other pending joint venture claims has not gone unnoticed,
for it surely has been a factor producing a good number of awards on
agreed terms. 0 9 It can be assumed too that its impact eventually will
extend well beyond the confines of the Tribunal.
To sum up, then, there is no doubt that the Tribunal's awards in
HA US and other cases have greatly helped to clarify the status of partnership, and especially joint venture, claims under international
law.' 0 The present writer's views on the various problems raised by
such claims have been stated throughout this article, appear to be amply documented by the authorities reviewed in Sections II-IV, and
hence need no elaborate restatement here. Put briefly, they are as
follows:
A. Customary international law permits partnership claims qua
partnership claims (and by analogy would permit claims by joint
ventures) only when all the members of a partnership (or all the
participants in a joint venture) established in a claimant state are
nationals of that state.
1. Postwar British lump sum practice (as opposed to its diplomatic practice), permitting the claims of partnerships registered
in Great Britain without regard to the nationality of their partners, is a unique exception to the general rule that has little to
commend it.
2. Postwar Swiss lump sum practice, permitting the claims of
Swiss partnerships when Swiss partners have predominant interests therein, constitutes a functional variation on the general rule
but is reasonably compatible with it.
3. Article VII(l) of the Claims Settlement Agreement, which
authorizes partnership and joint venture claims when the entity
involved has been organized under claimant state law and is 50
percent claimant state-owned, also constitutes a functional ,aria108. For an earlier award allowing a U.S. corporation that was a participant with a French
corporation in a 50-50 joint venture to claim for its one-half share of damages sustained by the
joint venture, see Morrison-Knudsen Pacific Ltd. v. Iran, 7 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 54, 66 (1984-Ill).
109. See, e.g., Morrison-Knudsen Int'l Co. v. Iran, 9 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 357 (1985-II) (award
of $4.9 million based upon claimant's 40 percent and 45 percent interests in two non-U.S. joint
ventures). For the record, the present writer submitted an expert opinion on behalf of the claimant in this case.
110. Primarily with respect to the impact of the nationality requirement upon such claims.
For other closely linked issues that may require clarification in the future, see Jones, supra note
100, at 71 n.84.
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tion on the general rule - derived from recent U.S. lump sum
and "preadjudication" practice - that has been applied routinely

by the Tribunal.1 1
B.

Customary international law permits claimant state partners

and participants in ineligible claimant state as well as respondent or
third state partnerships and joint ventures to bring claims based
upon their pro rata interests in the partnership or joint venture.
1. The fact that a partnership or joint venture established in a
non-common law state may have attributes of legal personality
does not preclude the application of the above rule, since interna-

tional tribunals and foreign offices uniformly have looked to customary international law and, without exception, have not
regarded themselves bound by municipal law concepts.
2. Since the interests of partners in a partnership are severable,

an injury to a partnership constitutes a direct injury to each of its
partners.

By analogy, an injury to a joint venture should be

treated as a similar direct injury to each of its participants.
3.

The extent of this direct injury to a given partner or partici-

pant is measured by the extent of his interest in the partnership or
joint venture. The pro rata approach to valuing the claims of
partners and participants has been followed consistently by international tribunals and foreign offices.

11. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Note that in the cases where the Tribunal has
rendered awards in favor of U.S. partnerships, the U.S. ownership interests therein have substantially exceeded the 50 percent minimum requirement. However, in a case involving a joint venture claim under the Vietnam Claims Program, supra note 42, the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission, after a rehearing, allowed an award where the U.S. ownership interest barely exceeded the statutory 50 percent minimum. Claim of Pecten Vietnam Co., 1985 FCSC Ann. Rep.
11, 11-12. Obviously, the lower the U.S. (or other claimant state) ownership interest in an ineligible partnership or joint venture under this approach, the less functional and hence less desirable it becomes. See generally Note, The Jurisprudence of the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission: Vietnam Claims, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 99, 115-19 (1986).

